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TO BE OR NOT TO BE AN EXPERT
R. E. SCHULMAN*
INTRODUCTION
To be or not to be an expert may no longer be the question for the
behavioral science expert.' The expert who has doubts or misgivings
about participation in criminal trials, would, upon even casual per-
usal of United States v. Bravner,2 elect not to participate. This
statement in legal parlance is conclusory and obviously deals with an
ultimate question-whether or not experts will continue to prostitute
themselves in the name of justice. Before proceeding to justify this
position, or perhaps mold the notion into a position for consideration,
some introductory statements and disclaimers are necessary.
The Law Quarterly has solicited comments on the Brawner case
from a variety of people with different backgrounds and experience.
The Law Quarterly editors have allowed wide discretion to each in
terms of style, format and tack taken in response to their invitation.
An undertaking such as this cannot be taken lightly, and the import-
ance of the decision will undoubtedly reach into comers which even
the drafters of the opinion have not contemplated. The rule in Brawner
applies only to federal courts and has the result of bringing federal
courts into closer harmony3 in their construction of insanity pleas.
Yet the prestige of this court throughout the country is likely to make
the Brawner case significant in many local courts across the land. This
will be true of jurisdictions where Durham v. United States4 has been
* Director, Division of Law and Psychiatry, The Menninger Foundation,
Topeka. Kansas: Professor of Law, University of Kansas Law School. B.A., 1958,
Northwestern University; M.A., 1960, Ph.D., 1962, University of Illinois; J.D., 1967,
University of Kansas.
1. The word "expert" will be used throughout this essay to refer to psychiatrists,
psychologists, social workers, and other behavioral scientists whose testimony is sought
by attorneys or courts for purposes of establishing or denying an insanity plea in a
criminal proceeding. There are differences between people with different profes-
sional backgrounds as well as differences between those with similar professional iden-
tification. This condensation is used to facilitate communication and because it is
believed by this observer that, with regard to the issues to be discussed, all experts
are placed in the same untenable position.
2. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3. Id. at 984.
4. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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followed explicitly, as well as in those jurisdictions such as Kansas
which adhere to the M'Naghten rule' but actually allow the flexi-
bility of Durham. The Brawner case unfortunately is likely to be con-
strued by many as a call for law and order in spite of the court's state-
ments to the contrary.6 The potential impact of Brawner makes the
task of commenting upon it onerous, and one approached with trepida-
tion. The Law Quarterly editors supplied to each commentator not
only the decision itself but also the briefs submitted by the parties,
supplemental memoranda, and briefs submitted by amici curiae. The
amount of effort that has gone into the drafting of the opinion, its
length and scholarliness, plus the well-prepared supporting documents
and briefs, 7 present a formidable and weighty legal analysis of the is-
sues relevant and central to the primary legal thrust of the case. The
sheer weight, the deluge of words, eloquently articulated, does raise
a question as to what more can be said.
Nevertheless, commentators here and elsewhere will undoubtedly
follow the traditional legal style of treating legal principles set forth
by the court and further elucidating the technical impact the decision
will have on the rule of law considered and the criminal justice sys-
tem. While not wishing to undermine the traditional legal scholar's
method of analysis, perhaps in this instance it may be more fruitful to
consider from a slightly different perspective what the majority and
Chief Judge Bazelon, in his concurring opinion, succeeded in doing or
undoing. This commentator is aware of what the standard legal ex-
ercise would be, but is persuaded that little can be accomplished by fur-
ther analyses of that nature. This comment, then, will not be a legal
analysis, but will address the issues raised in Brawner from the per-
spective of the expert witness, and will hopefully convey an under-
standing of the decision that other people (experts) of similar persua-
sion would maintain and articulate if they had the opportunity to com-
ment publicly on this case.
The editors of the Law Quarterly have provided a summary of the
law for the symposium, and the opinion can more than adequately
5. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
6. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
7. The briefs, memoranda, and supplemental documents, while not generally
available, contain information which is available elsewhere. The issues dealt with are
not new and have been extensively commented upon by many well-informed individuals.
A listing, however exhaustive, would undoubtedly exclude important references and
thus such a task is not undertaken here.
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speak for itself. This comment is more personal in nature, less schol-
arly, but perhaps a reflection of justified outrage and feelings of am-
bivalence toward the court for the manner in which it has dealt with
the expert. There is little excuse for the court's scapegoating and its
failure to substantially recognize the inadequacies of the criminal jus-
tice system. The court has adhered to the outdated, outmoded free
will doctrines and has failed to recognize that expert witness testimony
has nothing to do with mens rea, intention, causality, product, or any
other term designed to correlate general maladaptive behavior or men-
tal illness with a specific action by any individual.
TmE BRAWNER DECISION
In this commentator's view, there are at least two pivotal issues upon
which the majority opinion is balanced. First, the court states expli-
citly that it is dealing with a rule of law, developing a statement of the
court's position with respect to the ultimate question of criminal respon-
sibility. This is an appropriate issue upon which the court should fo-
cus its deliberation. Regardless of whether one agrees with the court's
opinion and reasoning, one must recognize the appropriateness of under-
taking the task. This aspect of the case is relatively straightforward,
with legal issues clearly considered and developed.
The second pivotal issue concerns the expert's role in the process.
The issue of expert witness testimony cannot be finely separated from
the legal rule as long as the "intention issue"9 is believed to be re-
lated to medical or psychological information as provided exclusively
by medical or psychological experts.' 0 The court's adoption of a dif-
ferent rule, but one still requiring expert opinion, continues the fic-
tion that information provided by experts is a necessary ingredient.
However, the ingredient is to be sifted into the recipe without any "un-
8. Throughout the opinion the concept of mens rea is visible, although disguised.
See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985-86 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court does
deal with arguments to abolish the insanity defense. Primarily the court bases its decision
against abolition on tradition and constitutional restraints, an all too familiar way of
not considering the issue.
9. Free will or mens rea.
10. Perhaps people other than experts can provide useful information to the court
concerning these issues. Family members, for example, may have been in a position to
observe the defendant just prior to his alleged actions, a position the expert rarely is in.
See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010-11 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C..,
concurring).
Vol. 1973:571
Washington University Open Scholarship
60 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:57
dud domination ' " or influence by the experts. The court stresses
that the jury and not the expert has the complicated, if not impossible,
task of melding into its decision moral,12 legal and ethical considera-
tions. The court gives back to the jury its primary function.' 8  But
still the court will not frame the jury's responsibility in terms of what is
just or unjust since that would leave the jury to define these concepts
on their own,' 4 a task beyond the jury's capacity. The expert should
no longer be allowed to directly and expressly influence the trier of
fact.
These two issues which underlie the court's reasoning are treated as
if they were necessarily correlated. That is to say, that by changing the
test the expert's influence will be diminished, or that by changing the
input of the expert the test will change. The weakness of these argu-
ments concerning the jury's function, the naive assumption that a change
in the rule will change the procedure, and the continuation of the worn-
out free will philosophy lead one to conclude that the majority wishes to
take the opportunity to apply sanctions and criticisms to the expert.
The court was urged to consider the abolition of the insanity defense.
However, the court reasoned from legal theory that the issue of free
will must continue to dominate the legal perspective of criminal be-
havior. But if this is the case, what do experts know about "intentions"
used in the legal sense by courts when considering the insanity issue?
In most instances the expert is probably beyond the scope of his
knowledge when he attempts to make statements about intention in the
sense that they relate to the mens rea doctrine. Intention has little or
nothing to do with psychological illness or, if you prdfer, maladaptive
behavior. The court reifies the intention doctrine, acting as if the
concept were not man-made and changeable by man. Throughout,
the court recognizes the complicated, intricate, delicate task that
the jury must accomplish. Why not leave it to the jury completely, and
totally remove the expert from the litigation phase concerned with crim-
inal responsibility? Perhaps if the court will not do that, then this is the
time for the expert to opt out himself.' 5
11. Id. at 983-84.
12. But not in the narrow religious sense. Id. at 982.
13. Id. at 989-90.
14. Id. at 986-89.
15. This is not a novel suggestion; however, the impetus for opting out of the system
may be greater following the Brawner decision.
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The majority views its decision as a step forward and as an effort to
untangle the complicated rules of criminal responsibility; but from
the expert's view it may be a step backward, not because of restric-
tions placed on testimony but because of the complete lack of under-
standing by the court of the framework within which the expert works.
This dismal abyss, after so many years of attempts at rapprochement
between the law and its experts, brought the court to the point of cas-
tigating the expert, which was unnecessary if the court only wished to
change the legal rule regarding insanity.
The impaling of the expert by the majority is intensified by Chief
Judge Bazelon in his concurring opinion. He begins his opinion by
taking valid issue with the announced new rule and argues semantic
gamesmanship on the part of the majority. The thrust of Bazelon's
objection to the majority opinion is diminished, however, by the axe-
grinding one begins to sense in Bazelon's own writing. Bazelon ac-
knowledges the need for change and that the Durham rule he authored
fell short because of inherent weaknesses. He argues that what should
have been forthcoming from the court was an updated, revised version
of Durham instead of the American Law Institute test, a test which
Bazelon perceives as moving in the wrong direction, or worse, in a
backward direction.' Bazelon does not need, nor is he asking for,
sympathy, and yet it is impossible to read the opinion and not feel
that the author of Durham has been betrayed. One senses conspiracy
by his judicial colleagues and betrayal by the expert community. The
Durham rule has been used by the experts to gain domination, and
the collegial conspiracy of the majority amounts to putting the law back
where "it should be" or at least taking it away from where it should
not be. The majority base their decision on this distorted perception
of expert domination, but why does Bazelon fall into this same trap?17
His opinion supports the majority as they take the expert to task. The
betrayal Bazelon experiences is multidimensional, but understandably
related to unrealistic expectations of what experts could deliver. Baze-
Ion is understanding and accurate in his assessment of procedural prob-
16. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
17. Bazelon states that Durham did not remove the expert's "strangle hold" on the
procces, and experts continued to offer conclusions and judgments based on their view
as to an appropriate legal outcome. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010-11
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Experts are castigated for offering conclusions instead of correlative
productivity statements.
Vol. 1973:571
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lems surrounding expert testimony,"' but that does not undo the support
or at least implicit support he gives to the majority's condemnation of
the expert.
The entire decision, the majority as well as concurring opinion, is
an example of scapegoating. This kind of reasoning or rationalizing
about expert domination demonstrates why experts have been able (if
they have) to exercise influence in the court. If the experts have domi-
nated, it is because attorneys and judges have avoided their reponsi-
bilities.
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ExPERT
The ascendency of the expert as the "golden boy" of the court be-
gan prior to the turn of the century and culminated in Durham. The
rise of the expert in cases involving criminal responsibility is relatively
easy to understand if one first looks at the relationship between law
and the behavioral sciences which developed in civil matters. Aside
from criminal matters, the legal system and attorneys traditionally
have had the duty of restricting the activity of mentally ill persons who
would otherwise disturb the ongoing activities of the community. The
expert's duty was to treat or rehabilitate an individual so he could again
function in the community. Prior to modern behavioral science,
what this meant was that the law restrained mentally ill people. The
advent of behavioral science, as we broadly understand it today, gave
the attorney the opportunity to seek help and guidance in dealing with
mentally ill people as he carried out his responsibility to the com-
munity. The lawyers were seeking help and the experts were willing
to give it.
The alienists (psychiatrists) did not wish to be isolated from the
criminal area of the law, and from the time of M'Naghten they in-
creasingly sought recognition. It is clear that the courts wished to
have the burdensome responsibility of considering the question of crim-
inal intent lightened. The erosion of the court's responsibility and ab-
dication of that responsibility in favor of the expert resulted in the
Durhani decision. As has been noted by numerous commentators,
Durham freed the behavioral science expert and supposedly allowed
him to apply his skill unfettered by legal shackles. The expert could
18. Indigent persons-really persons of modest means-are unable to obtain qual-
ity "expertise." Most often this problem is related not to quality per so, but to the
amount of time (economic consideration) the expert can devote to a patient-offender.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/5
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describe to the trier of fact the nuances and subtleties of personality
functioning of the individual who had allegedly violated the law. Before
Durham, the expert often had much the same leeway in individual
cases, but this operated on a case-by-case basis. Thus attention was
not called to the expert's "domination" of the court procedures. The
institutionalization of this "domination" following Durham, or at
least the potential for such domination, called too much attention to this
factor, and subsequent cases"9 began to again limit the expert's free-
dom in testifying. Brawner is the logical conclusion of the trend
which followed Durham. The rise of the expert's prominent role must
be attributed to the legal system's inability to deal with the problem and
reflects judicial efforts to find solutions elsewhere. Surely the expert
did not just take over the court in cases where criminal responsibility
was an issue; if the expert did approach a position of dominance it was
due to the willingness of the courts to relinquish control.
The Brawner opinion pretends that the expert assertively took the
position of dominance and in a sense overpowered the judge. The ac-
tual situation is more accurately described as a covert agreement be-
tween court and attorney to maneuver the expert into the position of
giving conclusory statements on the ultimate issues. The expert filled
the void left by the court-a void which, in spite of Brawner, will still
exist. The expert merely shielded the court from painful scrutiny of
its deficiencies in dealing with intention, free will and the criminal jus-
tice system.
The Brawner opinion intimates that the behavioral science expert
had some desire to control the court, some hidden agenda, some so-
cial-political axe to grind.20 The court claims that the behavioral
science expert was substituting his judgment concerning morality and
criminal standards for that of the court or jury. If this occurred, it
occurred because the court and attorneys asked for these judgments,
and not only allowed such judgments, but encouraged the expert to re-
spond in judgmental conclusory ways.
The expert is culpable of overselling his product. This was an error
in judgment on the part of the experts. The overselling by experts of
skills which are imperfect and geared to the "clinical imperfection"
that can be tolerated when working in a hospital, rehabilitation
19. See the introduction to this symposium, supra, for cases subsequent to Durham
which began carving away at the illusory freedom of the expert.
20. 471 F.2d at 983-84, 1010-11.
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center, or other clinical setting, contributes to Bazelon's unrealistic
expectations and disappointment. Clinical imperfections are not tol-
erable when decisions made concerning a person are not remedial but
punitive and not easily corrected except through expensive and compli-
cated legal procedures. The legitimate product to be marketed by the
expert is a diagnosis of present mental disorder and its treatment to-
ward rehabilitation of the accused. None of these functions has any
scientific relationship to a state of mind at a specific point in the past.
No one is able to make that determination. Consequently, the law
and its jurists may be trapped into the position of placing crucial im-
portance on an intervening variable (mens rea) which is easy to give lip
service to, but defies observation, delineation, and measurement. It is
possible to say something about mental disturbance existing at earlier
times in a person's life and maybe even at the time past behavior took
place, but that still does not say anything about intention, productivity
or causality. It was difficulties of this nature which forced courts to
Durham, irresistible impulse and other modifications of M'Naghten. If
jurists and attorneys had been satisfied with statements which were
possible for the expert to make, the rise and subsequent fall of the
expert would not have occurred. The court, in its effort to have a
definite and precise statement of the relationship between mental con-
dition and specific alleged behavior, modified the test of responsibil-
ity in ways designed to foster greater reliance on the expert. But the
court still asked the wrong questions and required the expert to tie
specific behavior to mental disturbance and in this way respond to the
ultimate question.21 Now in Brawner we have the court suggesting that
this was done by the experts in an effort to assert influence.
For reasons of its own, the legal system allowed or forced experts to
assume a prominent role in deciding cases. The greater the attention
paid to questions of intent, the greater the role of the expert. The
greater the interest in being sure that the defendant deserved to be pun-
ished, the greater the role of the expert. The expert's rise within the le-
gal system also reflected society's greater acceptance of the psychologi-
cal underpinnings of not only criminal behavior but also behavior gen-
21. I cannot undertake a discussion of the free will versus determinism debate, but
it should be noted that the expert's adherence to a deterministic model does not lead to
predictions of specific responses. Rather, the expert's opinion based on a deter-
ministic model can attempt prediction (and postdiction) of a range of possible responses
and behaviors. That is, given personality factors A-C plus historical factors D-F,
then responses G-Z are possible.
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erally. With this increasing acceptance came unreasonable expecta-
tions by the law and unrealistic claims by experts of what could be
accomplished and understood through the knowledge and technology
of behavioral science. Perhaps the most important reason for the ex-
aggerated optimism was the growing awareness that the courts and
penal systems did very poorly in understanding intention and criminal
behavior, and in doing anything at all about recidivism and rehabilita-
tion. The more the courts recognized their inadequacy, the greater
the judicial frustration and the greater the reliance at the time of deci-
sion on experts. This misguided scheme was and still is doomed to
failure, but the law is slow to change and Brawner is a reflection of
unwillingness to depart from tradition.
Everyone is responsible22 for his actions, even those actions grow-
ing out of an insane delusion. After all, who is responsible for any de.
lusion except the person suffering it? Such arguments have been made
before but have not persuaded the court. Why is the court so closed to
considering new approaches which would not only facilitate the pro-
gress and process of the criminal justice system, but lead more effi-
ciently to the ultimately stated goal of rehabilitation? Perhaps one
reason is that the court and society will not come to grips with the fact
that we do wish to punish and not rehabilitate wrongdoers. Simultan-
eously, however, we attempt to psychologically demonstrate a sensi-
tivity, perhaps humanitarianism, by not punishing those few seriously
deranged people who supposedly are not responsible-not just for al-
leged criminal behavior but any behavior. These few people that
would fall within this category could be detected by any sensitive at-
torney and should not require extensive, expensive psychiatric evalua-
tion. Everyone, judges, attorneys and experts, who becomes involved
in this process knows that it is nothing but a game.
But the game persists and will persist in spite of-or because of-
Brawner. Bazelon charges that the decision changes nothing, and he is
undoubtedly and unfortunately correct. The court did have the oppor-
tunity to do something creative and innovative, but it failed. Perhaps
when experts learn of this decision-not the rule announced, but the
lashing out at experts which moves through the decision like a yam-
22. A deterministic model of human behavior does not lead to the conclusion of
no responsibility. The argument can be made that a deterministic model produces
the ultimate responsibility insofar as the person is responsible for all behavior. Such a
model, for example, would leave no room for excusable negligence of any kind.
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pire drawing blood at every opportunity-then perhaps the experts will
indeed take the initiative. The initiative may come in a form neither
imaginative nor creative, but by the expert's refusal to become involved
with a person for the purpose of testifying at the trial level. The re-
sult of such a "work stoppage" would focus the issue clearly as one for
the courts to resolve, thus putting the expert back where he belongs,
in the rehabiliation setting. The man-hours wasted by experts, not to
mention the cost to all of us, on insanity pleas is absurd and an out-
rageous fraud on the public by both the legal system and the expert
community. If the leaders in charge of the legal system cannot respond
innovatively to a problem that has been considered ad nauseam for too
many years, then perhaps experts must take a dominant, assertive, lead-
ership role, even if it be through abstention. If experts do this, some
will claim lack of cooperation, but to date there really has been little
cooperation and even less understanding. This is what Brawner really
stands for.
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